McCORMICK, District Judge.
Gonzalo Mendez, William Guzman, Frank Palomino, Thomas Estrada
and Lorenzo Ramirez, as citizens of the United States, and on
behalf of their minor children, and as they allege in the
petition, on behalf of 'some 5000' persons similarly affected,
all of Mexican or Latin descent, have filed a class suit
pursuant to Rule 23 of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following
section 723c, against the Westminister, Garden Grov and El
Modeno School Districts, and the Santa Ana City Schools, all of
Orange County, California, and the respective trustees and
superintendents of said school districts.
The complaint, grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States1
and Subdivision 14 of Section 24 of the Judicial Code, Title 28, Section 41,
subdivision 14, U.S.C.A.,2
alleges a concerted policy and design of class discrimination
against 'persons of Mexican or Latin descent or extraction' of
elementary school age by the defendant school agencies in the
conduct and operation of public schools of said districts,
resulting in the denial of the equal protection of the laws to
such class of persons among which are the petitioning school
children.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege:
'That for several years last past respondents have and do now in
furtherance and in execution of their common plan, design and
purpose within their respective Systems and Districts, have by
their regulation, custom and usage and in execution thereof
adopted and declared: That all children or persons of Mexican or
Latin descent or extraction, though Citizens of the United
States of America, shall be, have been and are now excluded from
attending, using, enjoying and receiving the benefits of the
education, health and recreation facilities of certain schools
within their respective Districts and Systems but that said
children are now and have been segregated and required to and
must attend and use certain schools in said Districts and
Systems reserved for and attended solely and exclusively by
children and persons of Mexican and Latin descent, while such
other schools are maintained attended and used exclusively by
and for persons and children purportedly known as White or
Anglo-Saxon children.
'That in execution of said rules and regulations, each, every
and all the foregoing children are compelled and required to and
must attend and use the schools in said respective Districts
reserved for and attended solely and exclusively by children of
Mexican and Latin descent and are forbidden, barred and excluded
from attending any other school in said District or System
solely for the reason that said children or child are of Mexican
or Latin descent.'
The petitioners demand that the alleged rules, regulations,
customs and usages be adjudged void and unconstitutional and
that an injunction issue restraining further [546] application
by defendant school authorities of such rules, regulations,
customs, and usages.
It is conceded by all parties that there is no question of race
discrimination in this action. It is, however, admitted that
segregation per se is practiced in the above-mentioned school
districts as the Spanish-speaking children enter school life and
as they advance through the grades in the respective school
districts. It is also admitted by the defendants that the
petitioning children are qualified to attend the public schools
in the respective districts of their residences.
In the Westminister, Garden Grove and El Modeno school districts
the respective boards of trustees had taken official action,
declaring that there be no segregation of pupils on a racial
basis but that nonEnglish-speaking children (which group,
excepting as to a small number of pupils, was made up entirely
of children of Mexican ancestry or descent), be required to
attend schools designated by the boards separate and apart from
English-speaking pupils; that such group should attend such
schools until they had acquired some proficiency in the English
language.
The petitioners contend that such official action evinces a
covert attempt by the school authorities in such school
districts to produce an arbitrary discrimination against school
children of Mexican extraction or descent and that such illegal
result has been established in such illegal result has been
established in such school districts respectively. The school
authorities of the City of Santa Ana have not memorialized any
such official action, but petitioners assert that the same
custom and usage exists in the schools of the City of Santa Ana
under the authority of appropriate school agencies of such city.
The concrete acts complained of are those of the various school
district officials in directing which schools the petitioning
children and others of the same class or group must attend. The
segregation exists in the elementary schools to and including
the sixth grade in two of the defendant districts, and in the
two other defendant districts through the eighth grade. The
record before us shows without conflict that the technical
facilities and physical conveniences offered in the schools
housing entirely the segregated pupils, the efficiency of the
teachers therein and the curricula are identical and in some
respects superior to those in the other schools in the
respective districts.
The ultimate question for decision may be thus stated: Does such
official action of defendant district school agencies and the
usages and practices pursued by the respective school
authorities as shown by the evidence operate to deny or deprive
the so-called non-english-speaking school children of Mexican
ancestry or descent within such school districts of the equal
protection of the laws?
The defendants at the outset challenge the jurisdiction of this
court under the record as it exists at this time. We have
already denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the action upon
the 'face' of the complaint. No reason has been shown which
warrants reconsideration of such decision.
While education is a State matter, it is not so absolutely or
exclusively. Cumming v. Board
of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct.
197, 201, 44 L.Ed. 262. In the Cumming decision the Supreme
Court said: 'That education of the people in schools maintained
by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective
states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority
with the management of such schools cannot be justified except
in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights
secured by the supreme law of the land.' See, also, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172; Wong Him v. Callahan, C.C., 119 F. 381; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36,
17 Am.Rep. 405; Piper
et al. v. Big Pine School District, 193 Cal. 664, 226
P. 926.
Obviously, then, a violation by a State of a personal right or
privilege protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in the exercise
of the State's duty to provide for the education of its citizens
and inhabitants would justify the Federal Court to intervene. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208.
The complaint before us in this action, having alleged an
invasion by the common school authorities of the defendant
districts of the equal opportunity of pupils to acquire
knowledge, confers jurisdiction on this court if the actions
complained of are deemed those of the State. Hamilton v. Regents of University
of California, 293 U.S. 245, 55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed.
343; cf. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446.
[547]
Are the actions of public school authorities of a rural or city
school in the State of California, as alleged and established in
this case, to be considered actions of the State within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to confer jurisdiction
on this court to hear and decide this case under the authority
of Section 24, Subdivision 14 of the Judicial Code, supra? We
think they are.
In the public school system of the State of California the
various local school districts enjoy a considerable degree of
autonomy. Fundamentally, however, the people of the State have
made the public school system a matter of State supervision.
Such system is not committed to the exclusive control of local
governments. Article IX, Constitution of California, Butterworth v. Boyd, 12
Cal.2d 140, 82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838. It is a matter of
general concern, and not a municipal affair. Esberg v. Badaracco, 202
Cal. 110, 259 P. 730; Becker
v. Council of City of Albany, 47 Cal.App.2d 702, 118
P.2d 924.
The Education Code of California provides for the requirements
of teachers' qualifications, the admission and exclusion of
pupils, the courses of study and the enforcement of them, the
duties of superintendents of schools and of the school trustees
of elementary schools in the State of California. The
appropriate agencies of the State of California allocate to
counties all the State school money exclusively for the payment
of teachers' salaries in the public schools and such funds are
apportioned to the respective school districts within the
counties. While, as previously observed, local school boards and
trustees are vested by State legislation with considerable
latitude in the administration of their districts, nevertheless,
despite the decentralization of the educational system in
California, the rules of the local school district are required
to follow the general pattern laid down by the legislature, and
their practices must be consistent with law and with the rules
prescribed by the State Board of Education. See Section 2204,
Education Code of California.
When the basis and composition of the public school system is
considered, there can be no doubt of the oneness of the system
in the State of California, or of the restricted powers of the
elementary school authorities in the political subdivisions of
the State. See Kennedy v.
Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 32 P. 558; Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal.
347, 38 P. 45; Ward v. San
Diego School District, 203 Cal. 712, 265 P. 821.
In Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, supra, and West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178,
1185, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674, the acts of
university regents and of a board of education were held acts of
the State. In the recent Barnette
decision the court stated: 'The Fourteenth Amendment, as now
applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State
itself and all of its creatures-- Boards of Education not
excepted.' Although these cases dealt with State rather than
local Boards, both are agencies and parts of the State
educational system, as is indicated by the Supreme Court in the
Barnette case, wherein
it stated: 'Such Boards are numerous and their territorial
jurisdiction often small. But small and local authority may feel
less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies
of publicity may be less vigilant in calling it to account.'
Upon an appraisal of the factual situation before this court as
illumined by the laws of the State of California relating to the
public school system, it is clear that the respondents should be
classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and
in such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution
set limits to their action. Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1051; Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 151 A.L.R. 1110; Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed.
1423; Home Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S.Ct. 312, 57
L.Ed. 510.
We therefore turn to consider whether under the record before us
the school boards and administrative authorities in the
respective defendant districts have by their segregation
policies and practices transgressed applicable law and
Constitutional safeguards and limitations and thus have invaded
the personal right which every public school pupil has to the
equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to obtain
the means of education.
We think the pattern of public education promulgated in the
Constitution of California and effectuated by provisions of the
Education Code of the State prohibits segregation of the pupils
of Mexican an[548]cestry in the elementary schools from the rest
of the school children.
Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution of California
directs the legislature to 'encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement' of the people. Pursuant to this basic directive by
the people of the State many laws stem authorizing special
instruction in the public schools for handicapped children. See
Division 8 of the Education Code. Such legislation, however, is
general in its aspects. It includes all those who fall within
the described classification requiring the special consideration
provided by the statutes regardless of their ancestry or
extraction. The common segregation attitudes and practices of
the school authorities in the defendant school districts in
Orange County pertain solely to children of Mexican ancestry and
parentage. They are singled out as a class for segregation. Not
only is such method of public school administration contrary to
the general requirements of the school laws of the State, but we
think it indicates an official school policy that is
antagonistic in principle to Sections 16004 and 16005 of the
Education Code of the State.3
Obviously, the children referred to in these laws are those of
Mexican ancestry. And it is noteworthy that the educational
advantages of their commingling with other pupils is regarded as
being so important to the school system of the State that it is
provided for even regardless of the citizenship of the parents.
We perceive in the laws relating to the public educational
system in the State of California a clear purpose to avoid and
forbid distinctions among pupils based upon race or ancestry4
except in specific situations5
not pertinent to this action. Distinctions of that kind have
recently been declared by the highest judicial authority of the
United States 'by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'
They are said to be 'utterly inconsistent with American
traditions and ideals.' Kiyoshi
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct.
1375, 1385, 87 L.Ed. 1774.
Our conclusions in this action, however,[549] do not rest solely
upon what we conceive to be the utter irreconcilability of the
segregation practices in the defendant school districts with the
public educational system authorized and sanctioned by the laws
of the State of California. We think such practices clearly and
unmistakably disregard rights secured by the supreme law of the
land. Cumming v. Board of
Education of Richmond County, supra.
'The equal protection of the laws' pertaining to the public
school system in California is not provided by furnishing in
separate schools the same technical facilities, text books and
courses of instruction to children of Mexican ancestry that are
available to the other public school children regardless of
their ancestry. A paramount requisite in the American system of
public education is social equality. It must be open to all
children by unified school association regardless of lineage.
We think that under the record before us the only tenable ground
upon which segregation practices in the defendant school
districts can be defended lies in the English language
deficiencies of some of the children of Mexican ancestry as they
enter elementary public school life as beginners. But even such
situations do not justify the general and continuous segregation
in separate schools of the children of Mexican ancestry from the
rest of the elementary school population as has been shown to be
the practice in the defendant school districts-- in all of them
to the sixth grade, and in two of them through the eighth grade.
The evidence clearly shows that Spanish-speaking children are
retarded in learning English by lack of exposure to its use
because of segregation, and that commingling of the entire
student body instills and develops a common cultural attitude
among the school children which is imperative for the
perpetuation of American institutions and ideals.6
It is also established by the record that the methods of
segregation prevalent in the defendant school districts foster
antagonisms in the children and suggest inferiority among them
where none exists. One of the flagrant examples of the
discriminatory results of segregation in two of the schools
involved in this case is shown by the record. In the district
under consideration there are two schools, the Lincoln and the
Roosevelt, located approximately 120 yards apart on the same
school grounds, hours of opening and closing, as well as recess
periods, are not uniform. No credible language test is given to
the children of Mexican ancestry upon entering the first grade
in Lincoln School. This school has an enrollment of 249
so-called Spanish-speaking pupils, and no so-called
English-speaking pupils; while the Roosevelt, (the other)
school, has 83 so-called English-speaking pupils and 25
so-called Spanish-speaking pupils. Standardized tests as to
mental ability are given to the respective classes in the two
schools and the same curricula are pursued in both schools and,
of course, in the English language as required by State law.
Section 8251, Education Code. In the last school year the
students in the seventh grade of the Lincoln were superior
scholarly to the same grade in the Roosevelt School and to any
group in the seventh grade in either of the schools in the past.
It further appears that not only did the class as a group have
such mental superiority but that certain pupils in the group
were also outstanding in the class itself. Notwithstanding this
showing, the pupils of such excellence were kept in the Lincoln
School. It is true that there is no evidence in the record
before us that shows that any of the members of this exemplary
class requested transfer to the other so-called intermingled
school, but the record does show without contradiction that
another class had protested against the segregation policies and
practices in the schools of this El Modeno district without
avail.
While the pattern or ideal of segregating the school children of
Mexican ancestry from the rest of the school attendance
permeates and is practiced in all of the four defendant
districts, there are procedural deviations among the school
administrative agencies in effectuating the general plan.
In Garden Grove Elementary School District the segregation
extends only through the fifth grade. Beyond, all pupils in such
district, regardless of their ancestry or linguistic
proficiency, are housed, instructed and associate in the same
school facility.
This arrangement conclusively the reasonableness or advisability
of any segregation of children of Mexican ances[550]try beyond
the fifth grade in any of the defendant school districts in view
of the standardized and uniform curricular requirements in the
elementary schools of Orange County.
But the admitted practice and long established custom in this
school district whereby all elementary public school children of
Mexican descent are required to attend one specified school (the
Hoover) until they attain the sixth grade, while all other
pupils of the same grade are permitted to and do attend two
other elementary schools of this district, notwithstanding that
some of such pupils live within the Hoover School division of
the district, clearly establishes an unfair and arbitrary class
distinction in the system of public education operative in the
Garden Grove Elementary School District.
The long-standing discriminatory custom prevalent in this
district is aggravated by the fact shown by the record that
although there are approximately 25 children of Mexican descent
living in the vicinity of the Lincoln School, none of them
attend that school, but all are peremptorily assigned by the
school authorities to the Hoover School, although the evidence
shows that there are no school zones territorially established
in the district. The record before us shows a paradoxical
situation concerning the segregation attitude of the school
authorities in the Westminister School District. There are two
elementary schools in this undivided area. Instruction is given
pupils in each school from kindergarten to the eighth grade,
inclusive. Westminister School has 642 pupils, of which 628 are
so-called English-speaking children, and 14 so-called
Spanish-speaking pupils. The Hoover School is attended solely by
152 children of Mexican descent. Segregation of these from the
rest of the school population precipitated such vigorous
protests by residents of the district that the school board in
January, 1944, recognizing the discriminatory results of
segregation, resolved to unite the two schools and thus abolish
the objectionable practices which had been operative in the
schools of the district for a considerable period. A bond issue
was submitted to the electors to raise funds to defray the cost
of contemplated expenditures in the school consolidation. The
bonds were not voted and the record before us in this action
reflects no execution or carrying out of the official action of
the board of trustees taken on or about the 16th of January,
1944. It thus appears that there has been no abolishment of the
traditional segregation practices in this district pertaining to
pupils of Mexican ancestry through the gamut of elementary
school life. We have adverted to the unfair consequences of such
practices in the similarly situated El Modeno School District.
Before considering the specific factual situation in the Santa
Ana City Schools it should be noted that the omnibus segregation
of children of Mexican ancestry from the rest of the student
body in the elementary grades in the schools involved in this
case because of language handicaps is not warranted by the
record before us. The tests applied to the beginners are shown
to have been generally hasty, superficial and not reliable. In
some instances separate classification was determined largely by
the Latinized or Mexican name of the child. Such methods of
evaluating language knowledge are illusory and are not conducive
to the inculcation and enjoyment of civil rights which are of
primary importance in the public school system of education in
the United States.
It has been held that public school authorities may
differentiate in the exercise of their reasonable discretion as
to the pedagogical methods of instruction to be pursued with
different pupils.7
And foreign language handicaps may be to such a degree in the
pupils in elementary schools as to require special treatment in
separate classrooms. Such separate allocations, however, can be
lawfully made only after credible examination by the appropriate
school authority of each child whose capacity to learn is under
consideration and the determination of such segregation must be
based wholly upon indiscriminate foreign language impediments in
the individual child, regardless of his ethnic traits or
ancestry
The defendant Santa Ana School District maintains fourteen
elementary schools which furnish instruction from kindergarten
to the sixth grade, inclusive.
About the year 1920 the Board of Education, for the purpose of
allocating pupils to the several schools of the district in
proportion to the facilities available at such[551] schools,
divided the district into fourteen zones and assigned to the
school established in each zone all pupils residing within such
zone. There is no evidence that any discriminatory or other
objectionable motive or purpose actuated the School Board in
locating or defining such zones.
Subsequently the influx of people of Mexican ancestry in large
numbers and their voluntary settlement in certain of the
fourteen zones resulted in three of the zones becoming occupied
almost entirely by such group of people.
Two zones, that in which the Fremont School is located, and
another contiguous area in which the Franklin School is
situated, present the only flagrant discriminatory situation
shown by the evidence in this case in the Santa Ana City
Schools. The Fremont School has 325 so-called Spanish-speaking
pupils and no so-called English-speaking pupils. The Franklin
School has 237 pupils of which 161 are so-called
English-speaking children, and 76 so-called Spanish-speaking
children.
The evidence shows that approximately 26 pupils of Mexican
descent who reside within the Fremont zone are permitted by the
School Board to attend the Franklin School because their
families had always gone there. It also appears that there are
approximately 35 other pupils not of Mexican descent who live
within the Fremont zone who are not required to attend the
Fremont School but who are also permitted by the Board of
Education to attend the Franklin School.
Sometime in the fall of the year 1944 there arose
dissatisfaction by the parents of some of the so-called
Spanish-speaking pupils in the Fremont School zone who were not
granted the privilege that approximately 26 children also of
Mexican descent, enjoyed in attending the Franklin School.
Protest was made en masse by such dissatisfied group of parents,
which resulted in the Board of Education directing its secretary
to send a letter to the parents of all of the so-called
Spanish-speaking pupils living in the Fremont zone and attending
the Franklin School that beginning September, 1945, the permit
to attend Franklin School would be withdrawn and the children
would be required to attend the school of the zone in which they
were living, viz., the Fremont School.
There could have been no arbitrary discrimination claimed by
plaintiffs by the action of the school authorities if the same
official course had been applied to the 35 other so-called
English-speaking pupils exactly situated as were the approximate
26 children of Mexican lineage, but the record is clear that the
requirement of the Board of Education was intended for and
directed exclusively to the specified pupils of Mexican ancestry
and if carried out becomes operative solely against such group
of children.
It should be stated in fairness to the Superintendent of the
Santa Ana City Schools that he testified he would recommend to
the Board of Education that the children of those who protested
the action requiring transfer from the Franklin School be
allowed to remain there because of long attendance and family
tradition. However, there was no official recantation shown of
the action of the Board of Education reflected by the letters of
the Secretary and sent only to the parents of the children of
Mexican ancestry.
The natural operation and effect of the Board's official action
manifests a clear purpose to arbitrarily discriminate against
the pupils of Mexican ancestry and to deny to them the equal
protection of the laws. The court may not exercise legislative
or administrative functions in this case to save such
discriminatory act from inoperativeness. Cf. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
271 U.S. 500, 46
S.Ct. 70 L.Ed. 1059. There are other discriminatory
customs, shown by the evidence, existing in the defendant school
districts as to pupils of Mexican descent and extraction, but we
deem it unnecessary to discuss them in this memorandum.
We conclude by holding that the allegations of the complaint
(petition) have been established sufficiently to justify
injunctive relief against all defendants, restraining further
discriminatory practices against the pupils of Mexican descent
in the public schools of defendant school districts. See Morris v. Williams, 8 Cir.,
149 F.2d 703.
Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of injunction
are accordingly ordered pursuant to Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Attorney for plaintiffs will within ten days from date hereof
prepare and present same under local Rule 7 of this court.