McCORMICK, District Judge.
Gonzalo Mendez, William Guzman, Frank Palomino, Thomas Estrada and
Lorenzo Ramirez, as citizens of the United States, and on behalf of
their minor children, and as they allege in the petition, on behalf of
'some 5000' persons similarly affected, all of Mexican or Latin
descent, have filed a class suit pursuant to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
28
U.S.C.A.
following
section
723c,
against
the
Westminister,
Garden
Grov
and
El
Modeno
School Districts, and the Santa Ana City Schools,
all of Orange County, California, and the respective trustees and
superintendents of said school districts.
The complaint, grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States1
and
Subdivision 14 of Section 24 of the Judicial Code,
Title 28, Section 41,
subdivision 14, U.S.C.A.,2
alleges a concerted policy and design of class discrimination against
'persons of Mexican or Latin descent or extraction' of elementary
school age by the defendant school agencies in the conduct and
operation of public schools of said districts, resulting in the denial
of the equal protection of the laws to such class of persons among
which are the petitioning school children.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege:
'That for several years last past respondents have and do now in
furtherance and in execution of their common plan, design and purpose
within their respective Systems and Districts, have by their
regulation, custom and usage and in execution thereof adopted and
declared: That all children or persons of Mexican or Latin descent or
extraction, though Citizens of the United States of America, shall be,
have been and are now excluded from attending, using, enjoying and
receiving the benefits of the education, health and recreation
facilities of certain schools within their respective Districts and
Systems but that said children are now and have been segregated and
required to and must attend and use certain schools in said Districts
and Systems reserved for and attended solely and exclusively by
children and persons of Mexican and Latin descent, while such other
schools are maintained attended and used exclusively by and for persons
and children purportedly known as White or Anglo-Saxon children.
'That in execution of said rules and regulations,
each, every and all the foregoing children are compelled and required
to and must attend and use the schools in said respective Districts
reserved for and attended solely and exclusively by children of Mexican
and Latin descent and are forbidden, barred and excluded from attending
any other school in said District or System solely for the reason that
said children or child are of Mexican or Latin descent.'
The petitioners demand that the alleged rules, regulations, customs and
usages be adjudged void and unconstitutional and that an injunction
issue restraining further [546] application by defendant school
authorities
of such rules, regulations, customs, and usages.
It is conceded by all parties that there is no question of race
discrimination in this action. It is, however, admitted that
segregation per se is practiced in the above-mentioned school districts
as the Spanish-speaking children enter school life and as they advance
through the grades in the respective school districts. It is also
admitted by the defendants that the petitioning children are qualified
to attend the public schools in the respective districts of their
residences.
In the Westminister, Garden Grove and El Modeno school districts the
respective boards of trustees had taken official action, declaring that
there be no segregation of pupils on a racial basis but that
nonEnglish-speaking children (which group, excepting as to a small
number of pupils, was made up entirely
of children of Mexican ancestry or descent), be required to attend
schools designated by the boards separate and apart from
English-speaking pupils; that such group should attend such schools
until they had acquired some proficiency in the English language.
The petitioners contend that such official action evinces a covert
attempt by the school authorities in such school districts to produce
an arbitrary discrimination against school children of Mexican
extraction or descent and that such illegal result has been established
in such illegal result has been established in such school districts
respectively. The school authorities of the City of Santa Ana have not
memorialized any such official action, but petitioners assert that the
same custom and usage exists in the schools of the City of Santa Ana
under the authority of appropriate school agencies of such city.
The concrete acts complained of are those of the various school
district officials in directing which schools the petitioning children
and others of the same class or group must attend. The segregation
exists in the elementary schools to and including the sixth grade in
two of the defendant districts, and in the two other defendant
districts through the eighth grade. The record before us shows without
conflict that the technical facilities and physical conveniences
offered in the schools housing entirely the segregated pupils, the
efficiency of the teachers therein and the curricula are identical and
in some respects superior to those in the other
schools in the respective districts.
The ultimate question for decision may be thus stated: Does such
official action of defendant district school agencies and the usages
and practices pursued by the respective school authorities as shown by
the evidence operate to deny or deprive the so-called
non-english-speaking school children of Mexican ancestry or descent
within such school districts of the equal protection of the laws?
The defendants at the outset challenge the jurisdiction of this court
under the record as it exists at this time. We have already denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss the action upon the 'face' of the
complaint. No reason has been shown which warrants reconsideration of
such decision.
While education is a State matter, it is not so absolutely or
exclusively. Cumming v. Board of
Education of Richmond County,
175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197, 201, 44 L.Ed. 262. In the Cumming decision
the Supreme Court said: 'That education of the people in schools
maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective
states, and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a
clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law
of the land.' See, also, Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172; Wong Him v. Callahan, C.C., 119 F.
381; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal.
36, 17 Am.Rep. 405; Piper et
al. v. Big Pine School District, 193 Cal.
664, 226 P. 926.
Obviously, then, a violation by a State of a
personal right or
privilege protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in the exercise of the
State's duty to provide for the education of its citizens and
inhabitants would justify the Federal Court to intervene. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305
U.S.
337,
59
S.Ct.
232,
83
L.Ed.
208.
The
complaint
before
us in
this action, having alleged an invasion by the common school
authorities of the defendant districts of the equal opportunity of
pupils to acquire knowledge, confers jurisdiction on this court if the
actions complained of are deemed those of the State. Hamilton v. Regents of University of
California, 293 U.S. 245, 55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed. 343; cf. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446.
[547]
Are the
actions of public school authorities of a rural or city school in the
State of California, as alleged and established in this case, to be
considered actions of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to confer jurisdiction on this court to hear and decide
this case under the authority of Section 24, Subdivision 14 of the
Judicial Code, supra? We think they are.
In the public school system of the State of California the various
local school districts enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy.
Fundamentally, however, the people of the State have made the public
school system
a matter of State supervision. Such system is not committed to the
exclusive control of local governments. Article IX, Constitution of
California, Butterworth v. Boyd,
12
Cal.2d
140,
82
P.2d
434,
126
A.L.R.
838.
It
is
a matter of general
concern, and not a municipal affair. Esberg
v.
Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110, 259 P. 730; Becker v. Council of City of Albany,
47
Cal.App.2d
702,
118
P.2d
924.
The Education Code of California provides for the requirements of
teachers' qualifications, the admission and exclusion of pupils, the
courses of study and the enforcement of them, the duties of
superintendents of schools and of the school trustees of elementary
schools in the State of California. The appropriate agencies of the
State of California allocate to counties all the State school money
exclusively for the payment of teachers' salaries in the public schools
and such funds are apportioned to the respective school districts
within the counties. While, as previously observed, local school boards
and trustees are vested by State legislation with considerable latitude
in the administration of their districts, nevertheless, despite the
decentralization of the educational system in California, the rules of
the local school district are required to follow the general pattern
laid down by the legislature, and their practices must be consistent
with law and with the rules prescribed by the State Board of Education.
See Section 2204, Education Code of California.
When the basis and composition of the public
school system is considered, there can be no doubt of the oneness of
the system in the State of California, or of the restricted powers of
the elementary school authorities in the political subdivisions of the
State. See Kennedy v. Miller,
97 Cal. 429, 32 P. 558; Bruch v.
Colombet, 104 Cal. 347, 38 P. 45; Ward v. San Diego School District,
203 Cal. 712, 265 P. 821.
In Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, supra, and West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147
A.L.R. 674, the acts of university regents and of a board of
education were held acts of the State. In the recent Barnette
decision the court stated: 'The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to
the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of
its creatures-- Boards of Education not excepted.' Although these cases
dealt with State rather than local Boards, both are agencies and parts
of the State educational system, as is indicated by the Supreme Court
in the Barnette case, wherein
it stated: 'Such Boards are
numerous and their territorial jurisdiction often small. But small and
local authority may feel less sense of responsibility to the
Constitution, and agencies of publicity may be less vigilant in calling
it to account.' Upon an appraisal of the factual situation before this
court as illumined by the laws of the State of California relating to
the public school system, it is clear that the respondents should be
classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and in
such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits
to their action. Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1051; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 151 A.L.R. 1110; Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423; Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227
U.S.
278,
33
S.Ct.
312,
57
L.Ed.
510.
We therefore turn to consider whether under the record before us the
school boards and administrative authorities in the respective
defendant districts have by their segregation policies and practices
transgressed applicable law and Constitutional safeguards and
limitations and thus have invaded the personal right which every public
school pupil has to the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to obtain the means of education.
We think the pattern of public education promulgated in the
Constitution of California and effectuated by provisions of the
Education Code of the State prohibits segregation of the pupils of
Mexican an[548]cestry in
the
elementary
schools
from
the rest of the school children.
Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution of California directs the
legislature to 'encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement' of the
people. Pursuant to this
basic directive by the people of the State many laws stem authorizing
special instruction in the public schools for handicapped children. See
Division 8 of the Education Code. Such legislation, however, is general
in its aspects. It includes all those who fall within the described
classification requiring the special consideration provided by the
statutes regardless of their ancestry or extraction. The common
segregation attitudes and practices of the school authorities in the
defendant school districts in Orange County pertain solely to children
of Mexican ancestry and parentage. They are singled out as a class for
segregation. Not only is such method of public school administration
contrary to the general requirements of the school laws of the State,
but we think it indicates an official school policy that is
antagonistic in principle to Sections 16004 and 16005 of the Education
Code of the State.3
Obviously, the children
referred to in these laws are those of Mexican ancestry. And it is
noteworthy that the educational advantages of their commingling with
other pupils is regarded as being so important to the school system of
the State that it is provided for even regardless of the citizenship of
the parents. We perceive in the laws relating to the public educational
system in the State of California a clear purpose to avoid and forbid
distinctions among pupils based upon race or ancestry4
except in specific situations5
not pertinent to
this action. Distinctions of that
kind have recently been declared by the highest judicial authority of
the United States 'by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' They are said
to be 'utterly inconsistent with American traditions and ideals.' Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States,
320
U.S.
81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385, 87 L.Ed. 1774.
Our conclusions in this action, however,[549] do not rest solely upon
what
we conceive to be the utter irreconcilability of the segregation
practices in the defendant school districts with the public educational
system authorized and sanctioned by the laws of the State of
California. We think such practices clearly and unmistakably disregard
rights secured by the supreme law of the land. Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond
County, supra.
'The equal protection of the laws' pertaining to the
public school
system in California is not provided by furnishing in separate schools
the same technical facilities, text books and courses of instruction to
children of Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public
school children regardless of their ancestry. A paramount requisite in
the American system of public education is social equality. It must be
open to all children by unified school association regardless of
lineage.
We think that under the record before us the only tenable ground upon
which segregation practices in the defendant school districts can be
defended lies in the English language deficiencies of some of the
children of Mexican ancestry
as they enter elementary public school life as beginners. But even such
situations do not justify the general and continuous segregation in
separate schools of the children of Mexican ancestry from the rest of
the elementary school population as has been shown to be the practice
in the defendant school districts-- in all of them to the sixth grade,
and in two of them through the eighth grade.
The evidence clearly shows that Spanish-speaking children are retarded
in learning English by lack of exposure to its use because of
segregation, and that commingling of the entire student body instills
and develops a common cultural attitude among the school children which
is imperative for the perpetuation of American institutions and ideals.6
It is also established by the record that the methods of segregation
prevalent in the defendant school districts foster antagonisms in the
children and suggest inferiority among them where none exists. One of
the flagrant examples of the discriminatory results of segregation in
two of the schools involved in this case is shown by the record. In the
district under consideration there are two schools, the Lincoln and the
Roosevelt, located approximately 120 yards apart on the same school
grounds, hours of opening and closing, as well as recess periods, are
not uniform. No credible language test is given to the children of
Mexican ancestry upon entering the first grade in Lincoln School. This
school has an enrollment of 249 so-called Spanish-speaking pupils, and
no so-called English-speaking pupils; while the
Roosevelt, (the other) school, has 83 so-called English-speaking pupils
and 25 so-called Spanish-speaking pupils. Standardized tests as to
mental ability are given to the respective classes in the two schools
and the same curricula are pursued in both schools and, of course, in
the English language as required by State law. Section 8251, Education
Code. In the last school year the students in the seventh grade of the
Lincoln were superior scholarly to the same grade in the Roosevelt
School and to any group in the seventh grade in either of the schools
in the past. It further appears that not only did the class as a group
have such mental superiority but that certain pupils in the group were
also outstanding in the class itself. Notwithstanding this showing, the
pupils of such excellence were kept in the Lincoln School. It is true
that there is no evidence in the record before us that shows that any
of the members of this exemplary class requested transfer to the other
so-called intermingled school, but the record does show without
contradiction that another class had protested against the segregation
policies and practices in the schools of this El Modeno district
without avail.
While the pattern or ideal of segregating the school children of
Mexican ancestry from the rest of the school attendance permeates and
is practiced in all of the four defendant districts, there are
procedural deviations among the school administrative agencies in
effectuating the general plan.
In Garden Grove Elementary School District the
segregation extends only through the fifth grade. Beyond, all pupils in
such district, regardless of their ancestry or linguistic proficiency,
are housed, instructed and associate in the same school facility.
This
arrangement conclusively the reasonableness or advisability of
any segregation of children of Mexican ances[550]try beyond the fifth
grade
in any of the defendant school districts in view of the standardized
and uniform curricular requirements in the elementary schools of Orange
County.
But the admitted practice and long established custom in this school
district whereby all elementary public school children of Mexican
descent are required to attend one specified school (the Hoover) until
they attain the sixth grade, while all other pupils of the same grade
are permitted to and do attend two other elementary schools of this
district, notwithstanding that some of such pupils live within the
Hoover School division of the district, clearly establishes an unfair
and arbitrary class distinction in the system of public education
operative in the Garden Grove Elementary School District.
The long-standing discriminatory custom prevalent in this district is
aggravated by the fact shown by the record that although there are
approximately 25 children of Mexican descent living in the vicinity of
the Lincoln School, none of them attend that school, but all are
peremptorily assigned by the school authorities to the Hoover School,
although the evidence shows
that there are no school zones territorially established in the
district. The record before us shows a paradoxical situation concerning
the segregation attitude of the school authorities in the Westminister
School District. There are two elementary schools in this undivided
area. Instruction is given pupils in each school from kindergarten to
the eighth grade, inclusive. Westminister School has 642 pupils, of
which 628 are so-called English-speaking children, and 14 so-called
Spanish-speaking pupils. The Hoover School is attended solely by 152
children of Mexican descent. Segregation of these from the rest of the
school population precipitated such vigorous protests by residents of
the district that the school board in January, 1944, recognizing the
discriminatory results of segregation, resolved to unite the two
schools and thus abolish the objectionable practices which had been
operative in the schools of the district for a considerable period. A
bond issue was submitted to the electors to raise funds to defray the
cost of contemplated expenditures in the school consolidation. The
bonds were not voted and the record before us in this action reflects
no execution or carrying out of the official action of the board of
trustees taken on or about the 16th of January, 1944. It thus appears
that there has been no abolishment of the traditional segregation
practices in this district pertaining to pupils of Mexican ancestry
through the gamut of elementary school life. We have adverted to the
unfair consequences of such practices in the similarly situated El
Modeno School District.
Before considering the specific factual situation
in the Santa Ana City Schools it should be noted that the omnibus
segregation of children of Mexican ancestry from the rest of the
student body in the elementary grades in the schools involved in this
case because of language handicaps is not warranted by the record
before us. The tests applied to the beginners are shown to have been
generally hasty, superficial and not reliable. In some instances
separate classification was determined largely by the Latinized or
Mexican name of the child. Such methods of evaluating language
knowledge are illusory and are not conducive to the inculcation and
enjoyment of civil rights which are of primary importance in the public
school system of education in the United States.
It has been held that public school authorities may differentiate in
the exercise of their reasonable discretion as to the pedagogical
methods of instruction to be pursued with different pupils.7
And foreign language handicaps may be to such a degree in the pupils in
elementary schools as to require special treatment in separate
classrooms. Such separate allocations, however, can be lawfully made
only after credible examination by the appropriate school authority of
each child whose capacity to learn is under consideration and the
determination of such segregation must be based wholly upon
indiscriminate foreign language impediments in the individual child,
regardless of his ethnic traits or ancestry
The defendant Santa Ana School District maintains fourteen elementary
schools which furnish instruction from kindergarten to the sixth grade,
inclusive.
About the year 1920 the Board of Education, for the purpose
of allocating pupils to the several schools of the district in
proportion to the facilities available at such[551] schools, divided
the
district into fourteen zones and assigned to the school established in
each zone all pupils residing within such zone. There is no evidence
that any discriminatory or other objectionable motive or purpose
actuated the School Board in locating or defining such zones.
Subsequently the influx of people of Mexican ancestry in large numbers
and their voluntary settlement in certain of the fourteen zones
resulted in three of the zones becoming occupied almost entirely by
such group of people.
Two zones, that in which the Fremont School is located, and another
contiguous area in which the Franklin School is situated, present the
only flagrant discriminatory situation shown by the evidence in this
case in the Santa Ana City Schools. The Fremont School has 325
so-called Spanish-speaking pupils and no so-called English-speaking
pupils. The Franklin School has 237 pupils of which 161 are so-called
English-speaking children, and 76 so-called Spanish-speaking children.
The evidence shows that approximately 26 pupils of Mexican descent who
reside within
the Fremont zone are permitted by the School Board to attend the
Franklin School because their families had always gone there. It also
appears that there are approximately 35 other pupils not of Mexican
descent who live within the Fremont zone who are not required to attend
the Fremont School but who are also permitted by the Board of Education
to attend the Franklin School.
Sometime in the fall of the year 1944 there arose dissatisfaction by
the parents of some of the so-called Spanish-speaking pupils in the
Fremont School zone who were not granted the privilege that
approximately 26 children also of Mexican descent, enjoyed in attending
the Franklin School. Protest was made en masse by such dissatisfied
group of parents, which resulted in the Board of Education directing
its secretary to send a letter to the parents of all of the so-called
Spanish-speaking pupils living in the Fremont zone and attending the
Franklin School that beginning September, 1945, the permit to attend
Franklin School would be withdrawn and the children would be required
to attend the school of the zone in which they were living, viz., the
Fremont School.
There could have been no arbitrary discrimination claimed by plaintiffs
by the action of the school authorities if the same official course had
been applied to the 35 other so-called English-speaking pupils exactly
situated as were the approximate 26 children of Mexican lineage, but
the record is clear that the requirement
of the Board of Education was intended for and directed exclusively to
the specified pupils of Mexican ancestry and if carried out becomes
operative solely against such group of children.
It should be stated in fairness to the Superintendent of the Santa Ana
City Schools that he testified he would recommend to the Board of
Education that the children of those who protested the action requiring
transfer from the Franklin School be allowed to remain there because of
long attendance and family tradition. However, there was no official
recantation shown of the action of the Board of Education reflected by
the letters of the Secretary and sent only to the parents of the
children of Mexican ancestry.
The natural operation and effect of the Board's official action
manifests a clear purpose to arbitrarily discriminate against the
pupils of Mexican ancestry and to deny to them the equal protection of
the laws. The court may not exercise legislative or administrative
functions in this case to save such discriminatory act from
inoperativeness. Cf. Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 46
S.Ct.
70
L.Ed.
1059.
There are other discriminatory customs, shown by the evidence, existing
in the defendant school districts as to pupils of Mexican descent and
extraction, but we deem it unnecessary to discuss them in this
memorandum.
We conclude by holding that the allegations of the complaint (petition)
have been established sufficiently to justify injunctive relief against
all defendants,
restraining further discriminatory practices against the pupils of
Mexican descent in the public schools of defendant school districts.
See Morris v. Williams, 8
Cir., 149 F.2d 703.
Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of injunction are
accordingly ordered pursuant to Rule 52,
F.R.C.P.
Attorney for plaintiffs will within ten days from date hereof prepare
and present same under local Rule 7 of this court.